What does the Ossetia crisis mean for self-determination in Europe?
Ever since President Wilson's 14 points, borne out of the wreckage left by the First World War, the self determination of peoples has featured as a principle of international affairs. But less clear is the definition of who has the right to self-determination?
When Yugoslavia broke up, the international community was willing to recognise the right of its internal units that had the status of republic (such as Slovenia and Croatia) to declare themselves independent, but not to recognise such a right for those that had the status of province (namely Kosovo, despite it having a bigger and linguisticly more distinct population than some of the republics). Recently, though after lengthy deliberations, part of the international community has changed its mind and recognised Kosovo's independence.
When the Soviet Union broke up, the 15 internal units that had the status of SSR ( Soviet Socialist Republic) were recognised as sovereign states, but not the ASSRs ( Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics ) or AOs (Autonomous Oblasts). Some of the SSRs (such as the Baltic republics) had previously existed as independent countries, but others were based on somewhat arbitrary boundaries, many of which were drawn up by Stalin when he was Commissar for Nationalities. Stalin also determined the hierarchy of which groups were to have their own SSR, which an ASSR, and which merely an AO. This sometimes changed over time: the Karelo-Finnish SSR was downgraded in 1956 to the Karelian ASSR - had this not happened, we would presumably now have an independent Karelia, possibly seeking unification with Finland . A Transcaucasion SSR existed until 1936, when it was split into Armenia , Georgia and Azerbaijan, the latter two including their own ASSRs and/or AOs. Would we now be defending the territorial integrity of Transcaucasia had Stalin not re-designed the borders?
It is not surprising that the legacy of Stalin's frontiers is now causing problems. Nagorno Karabach does not want to be part of Azerbaijan . The South Ossetians do not want to be part of Georgia and don't see why they can't be independent. Indeed, the Ossetians were bound to see Kosovan independence as a precedent. And if Serbia had sent its troops back into Kosovo last month, the western countries with troops there would certainly have reacted, as Russia did when the Georgians sent their troops into Ossetia - but hopefully not have over-reacted which the Russian's seem to have done so brutally.
The situation is highly complex. Georgia was wrong to attack Southern Ossetia , triggering the tragic events of the last few weeks. Russia is wrong to have reacted unilaterally and so disproportionately. Certainly, a due recognition by the west of this complexity would go a long way to avoiding any continued flexing of muscles by Russia or other actors in the region. As would some more consistent thought on the principles at stake.
It is not as though these issues are new. When Ireland opted out of the UK , its right to do so was challenged by many in Britain . Many Irish then questioned the right of Northern Ireland to opt out of Ireland and many in Northern Ireland opposed the right Fernheigh and Tyrone to opt out of Northern Ireland . Divergent opinions on who or what unit has the right to self-determination are inevitable and inherent to such situations.
Indeed, the question of whether Kosovo and South Ossetia should be recognised as sovereign states is only the latest in a trend that has seen the number of sovereign countries in Europe more than double in the space of a century, with every possibility that this trend will continue. In the living memory of our most senior citizens, there were only 22 states in Europe prior to 1918, and two of these, Albania and Norway , were only recently independent (1).
The break up Austria-Hungary and the Tsarist Empire at the end of the First World War saw this rise to 29, (2) soon reaching 30 with the establishment of an independent Ireland . At the end of the Second World War, however, this fell to 28, with the disappearance of Estonia , Latvia and Lithuania hardly compensated for by the creation of the GDR. This figures remained stable during the entire Cold War period.
Since the end of the Cold War, the break ups of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia saw this jump, within a decade, to 46 (3).
Recognition of the independence of Kosovo, Abkhazia and South Ossetia would bring us to nearly 50 sovereign states on the territory of Europe . And, of course, some would argue that the independence of Flanders, Scotland , the Basque country, Catalonia and Corsica is not beyond the bounds of the possible.
Some of these would be strongly contested, others less so - but what are the criteria? Is it possible to have objective criteria? If so, who should define them? If not, should any group that so wishes be able to constitute its own state? What about my constituency of Yorkshire (it's far bigger than Luxembourg !)? Should Gibraltar ? What about the Channel Islands ? How would Russia feel about applying the same principle as they argue for South Ossetia to Chechnya or Northern Ossetia?
In any case, i t is possible that a continent of 20 sovereign states in 1900 could have swelled to one with over 50 in the coming years. Most of them will be in the European Union. So, fragmentation will have been balanced by a degree of integration. Indeed, it is this very integration that has made it plausible, in some cases, for smaller units to be viable states. Arguing for independence within Europe sounds far less isolationist when you are simply making the case to upgrade your status rather than go off into the wilderness (although any area opting out of an existing EU country would require the agreement of all Member States to become a separate Member of the EU).
Nonetheless, a world fragmented into several hundred small countries along with just a handful of giants would not necessarily be a better place for smaller countries, nor in terms of getting world level agreement on global issues - not least environmental ones. There could also be an arms race as such countries seek to develop their own armies and defend themselves against real or imaginary threats from their neighbours. Much would depend on the multilateral frameworks created for integration and cooperation. And even if the EU certainly remains relatively successful in balancing unity and diversity, most of the world is not.
1 UK, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Spain, Portugal, France, Italy, Norway, Albania, Greece, Switzerland, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro and the Ottoman Empire. I have not counted the micro-states of Liechtenstein, Monaco, the Vatican City, Andorra or San Marino for the purposes of this article.
2 Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, Iceland, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and Yugoslavia but with the latter absorbing Serbia and Montenegro.
3 I am not counting Kazakhstan, which, however, considers itself to be European and which was recently admitted to UEFA
This article was originally published by EU Observer in October 2008