Economist debate on Britain and Europe
In the week starting September 9th 2007, I took part in a debate on the Economist's blog about the proposed EU Reform Treaty with Neil O'Brien, the director of the Eurosceptic lobbyists Open Europe. Throughout the week I and Neil responded to each other's open letters which discussed in some detail Britain's relationship with the EU, the proposed treaty, the question of the referendum and a variety of related topics.
The entire debate is reprinted below thanks to the Economist. Read a particular day's post by clicking the relevant link below.
A debate on Britain and the EU - day one
9th September
Dear Richard,
You and I both know that the new version of the constitutional treaty is essentially the same as the original. Plenty of EU leaders are happy to acknowledge that it is exactly the same thing.
The German chancellor Angela Merkel has said that: "The substance of the constitution is preserved. That is a fact."
The Spanish prime minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, declared that: "we have not let a single substantial point of the constitutional treaty go. It is, without a doubt, much more than a treaty. This is a project of foundational character, a treaty for a new Europe."
The EU commissioner Margot Wallstrom admitted that: "It's essentially the same proposal as the old constitution."
I could go on and on. Indeed, some of your colleagues also freely acknowledge the cynicism of the process. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing says: "all the earlier proposals will be in the new text, but will be hidden and disguised in some way."
I think I know exactly what you will say in response. You will say that while it might be the same for other member states, it is different for the UK because of its various opt-outs and safeguards.
It seems to me that there are three main problems with this argument. Firstly, the various safeguards the government are basing this argument on were also in the original version of the constitution-on which the government promised to hold a referendum.
Indeed, in 2004 Tony Blair made the same claims the government is now making, before going on to promise a referendum:
"It keeps unanimity for the most important decisions and, at our insistence, in particular for tax, social security, for foreign policy, for defence and for decisions on the financing of the union affecting the British budget contribution. It keeps our ability to opt out of measures affecting our laws on asylum and immigration and extends that so that we cannot be obliged to cooperate on criminal law procedures where we do not want to do so. The charter expressly rules out establishing any new power or task for the European Union or any change in the powers of the European Union."
Nonetheless, he went on to promise in the same speech that: "in the end, the final say will be with the British people in a referendum."
Secondly, there are good reasons to think that the various safeguards and declarations which the government clings to will be not work. To take just one example for now-and we'll come on to the others later on-the chaos over the status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights doesn't exactly inspire confidence in the red lines.
Tony Blair said when he came back from the June summit: "It is absolutely clear that we have an opt-out from both the charter and judicial and home affairs."
But the Swedish prime minister Frederick Reinfeldt says that: "It should be stressed that the UK was given a clarification, not an opt-out." He said, "It was important for the [Swedish] government to keep the charter legally binding, which now is the case. the UK accepted this."
Now even the UK Government also seems to have given up trying claim that they have neutered the charter. Your colleague Gary Titley (Labour's leader in the European Parliament) recently argued in a debate with Bob Crow that "The RMT is arguing that the UK has opted out of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. This is wrong."
The reason the UK protocol on the charter is proving impossible for the government to defend is that the nature of EU law makes it effectively impossible to have rights that apply in one country but not in another. For example, as soon as a trade union or business is involved in more than one country (ie all major businesses and large trade unions), or a migrant crosses a border, any UK-specific protocol would be immediately circumvented.
Furthermore, the current protocol says that only one part of the charter does not create new rights in the UK (Title IV on Social solidarity). This implies all the more strongly that all the other provisions (creating new rights for criminal suspects, cross-border migrants etc) certainly do create new rights. So the reality is that the charter will affect UK law.
Thirdly, the red lines are intended to distract from the many other important changes in the constitution, which also remain in the new version. For example:
The introduction of majority voting in many new areas-from energy policy to employment law for self employed workers.
The new voting system-which reduces member states ability to block legislation. Even the Foreign Office has admitted that it would be harder for the UK to stop proposals we don't want.
Giving the European Court of Justice jurisdiction over justice and policing for the first time. Back in 2000 the government admitted that that would be a fundamental transfer of "national sovereignty". But later it gave in and accepted it.
Perhaps later on this week we can explore the contents of the constitutional treaty in more depth . But I wondered if you could start by shedding some light on something which is a total mystery to me.
Increasingly I see ministers falling back on the argument that we simply don't have referendums in Britain. For people like you who were against promising a referendum in the first place, this is at least consistent. To hear it in the mouths of ministers who were all gung-ho for a referendum at the last election, is simply absurd.
But either way, isn't it just far, far too late now to start arguing that referendums are some kind of wicked foreign invention, undermining the fine traditions of British parliamentary democracy? The government has held 30 referendums in the last ten years. In doing so it has established the principle that if you want to change the rules of the political game, then you ask the people first.
Obviously, we can't have referendums on everything, and we are not saying that. But it is right to ask the voters when you made a change to our political institutions, particularly changes that are irreversible. And that is the case here-if we agree the constitution there is no going back to the EU we have today.
So what exactly is it that you think makes the case for a referendum on the treaty weaker than the case for a referendum on-say-the North East Assembly? Or were all those referendums just a big mistake?
Isn't it also a wee bit hypocritical of the government to bang on about the fine traditions of Parliament while simultaneously trashing any attempts to have meaningful debate in Parliament? Ministers refused to meet the Foreign Affairs and European Scrutiny committees for months. And when they finally showed up they simply stonewalled -showing total contempt for any attempt to hold them to account.
In October there will be approximately eight working days between the return of Parliament and the agreement of the new version of the constitution. And once signed it cannot be amended in Parliament, despite meaningless promises of "line by line scrutiny". So perhaps we can skip the lectures on parliamentary democracy.
We have heard again and again from the government the argument that the Tories did not hold a referendum on Maastricht or the Single Act. This boils down to an argument that somehow two wrongs do make a right.
In fact the failure to get public buy-in to the development of the EU over the decades is exactly what has triggered the current crisis. Let's not forget that, much as people in Brussels might wish it never happened, the voters of two of the founding member states did vote against the constitution not so very long ago. In the Netherlands nearly two thirds voted "no". Ignoring their wishes and simply pressing on is risky move.
The whole point of the constitutional process was supposed to be to "reconnect" the EU with voters. In the December 2001 "Laeken Declaration" which launched the constitutional process, EU leaders admitted that citizens "feel that deals are all too often cut out of their sight and they want better democratic scrutiny." They talked, for the first time, about returning powers to the member states. They were spot on.
But now ministers argue that that there is no democratic deficit . Far too many people in Brussels seem to agree. They believe the EU must just "do more" or "communicate more".
This is potentially very dangerous for the EU. I can't help thinking that the fact that EU leaders are now trying to push through the rejected constitution behind voters' backs, suggests they have learned exactly the wrong lessons from the "no" votes.
Best wishes,
Neil
A debate on Britain and the EU - day two
10th September
Dear Neil,
Recent scientific research shows that mice and human beings are 90% identical in genetic terms-but the 10% makes one heck of a difference! That is why I am happy to acknowledge that the reform treaty salvages the bulk of the practical changes to the EU system that were contained in the now abandoned constitution-but the things it drops are precisely the points that were most controversial and which gave rise in the first place to calls for a referendum.
We no longer have a proposal to repeal all the existing treaties and replace them by a constitution. Nor a proposal to change the name of the high representative to foreign minister, which caused people like you to have apoplexy because they felt that the term "minister" should be reserved for states. Items Eurosceptics felt had the trappings of statehood, ranging from the flag to the anthem have also been dropped and, yes, there are further opt-outs for Britain which do indeed made this a more different treaty for Britain than for other member states.
What we now have is a treaty that will amend the existing treaties, as we have tended to do every five years or so in our evolving and expanding union. The changes are designed to make the EU work more effectively and also to achieve the "better democratic scrutiny" that the Laeken declaration called for, which you cite approvingly. The package of measures agreed to this end are hardly revolutionary but are practical adjustments to what we already have-and they do not increase the remit of the European Union in that there are no new subjects which it will be able to deal with (unlike the Maastricht treaty, for example, which added new chapters on the environment and monetary union to the previous treaties).
Many of these changes are things that genuine sceptics (as opposed to people who have a visceral hatred of the EU and want Britain to leave it) should be pleased about: a smaller commission, stronger safeguards against centralisation, a fairer voting system in the council (which, incidentally, will increase Britain's share of the votes), a cap on the size of the European Parliament, a thirty-month instead of a six-month presidency of the European Council (thereby strengthening the main intergovernmental body of the union at the expense of the commission), an obligation on the council to meet in public when debating legislation; the laying down in the treaty of the obligation to respect the national identities of member states and the underscoring of the principle of conferred powers (whereby the union only has the competences bestowed on it by member states) and others.
EU legislation will be subject to the prior scrutiny of national parliaments and the double approval of both national governments in the EU Council and the directly elected MEPs-a level of scrutiny that exists in no other international structure. In other words, it will deliver a more focused EU, better capable of delivering in those policy areas where we benefit from common European action, but subject also to stronger safeguards and more scrutiny.
Rather than a dispassionate analysis of how significant these adjustments to the EU structure are, Europhobes often engage in a long diatribe in which all evil seems to have to its roots in the EU in general and the proposed reform treaty in particular. They have not hesitated to tell outright fibs: such as the lie that it would force Britain to relinquish its seat on the UN Security Council in favour of a single seat for the EU.
You yourself have rather focused on questioning the legitimacy of the exercise and quibbling the significance of Britain's opt-outs and on portraying the extension of qualified majority voting as a negative rather than a positive. Let me respond.
You make the claim that the EU is ignoring the wishes of the electorate following the "no" votes in France and the Netherlands, yet you fail to acknowledge that the treaty was accepted by 18 countries. Is it unreasonable for 27 countries to seek to find a new compromise that is acceptable to all? What is undemocratic about that?
On the opt-outs, the most significant one is the right for Britain to decide on a case by case basis whether to opt-in to legislation in the field of justice and home affairs-not just on asylum and immigration as now, but also on criminal law procedures. This is a significant change from the provisions of the previous constitution and renders null and void all the arguments of those claiming that Britain is "handing over" powers on criminal law to the EU. Britain will simply be able to choose on a case by case basis.
You also fret about the status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the special protocol for Britain (sometimes described as an opt-out). I have never understood why eurosceptics have focused so much on a charter the main aim of which was to ensure that the EU institutions respect the same rights as already apply in member states, so as to avoid any danger whatsoever of EU law being in conflict with human rights provisions that member states already apply to themselves. In other words, it is a constraint on the freedom of action of EU institutions which a genuine sceptic, as opposed to a Europhobe, should surely welcome. What the UK's protocol ensures is to make it clear that such a Charter of Rights does not create domestic law in Britain, in case that was not clear enough already.
On the extension of QMV, the Europhobes are trying to create a storm in a tea cup. It should be remembered that the veto is a double edged sword: if you have one, so does everybody else. Things that Britain wants can be blocked by the veto of just one of 26 other countries. Mrs Thatcher realised this was a problem when there were just 12 countries, which is why she supported the extension of QMV to measures affecting the single market.
Of course, unanimity is retained for all the sensitive areas (the famous "red lines" of the government: tax, social security, foreign policy, defence and decisions on the method of financing the EU, including the British budget contribution). To pretend that there is a massive change in this balance to Britain's disadvantage is wrong especially as most extensions to QMV are in areas that are either technical or where Britain has an opt-in/out. The few that are politically important are where it is in Britain's interest not to be blocked by the vetos of others.
This brings me to the issue of whether there should be a referendum. You are right to say that I have always had reservations about holding a referendum. If we are to introduce nationwide referendums as a main way of settling political issues in Britain then I can think of a fair number of issues which people may find more interesting than adjustments to the functioning of European institutions. From time to time one hears calls for a referendum on nuclear weapons, congestion charging, the death penalty, NATO, WTO, the monarchy or climate change targets. To start with one on changing the term of office of the president of the European Council from six months to thirty would be very odd!
Britain has never ratified an international treaty of any kind by means of a national referendum. We are a parliamentary democracy and we leave such matters to our national parliament. That is what we elected them for. Your disparaging remarks that ministers did not come to the Foreign Affairs and European Scrutiny committees when there was nothing yet to report and that MPs are not up to studying this issue in the short time available (unlike the electorate, presumably, as you want a referendum) are absurd. These issues have been debated now for the last six years, from the Laeken declaration onwards. It is time to put these institutional questions to bed and allow the EU to move on to the real policy issues that matter.
Best wishes,
Richard
A debate on Britain and the EU - day three
11th September
Dear Richard.
Thanks for your letter.
The first thing that strikes me about your argument is the amazing elevation of symbolism over substance. You start by saying:
The things it drops are precisely the points that were most controversial and which gave rise in the first place to calls for a referendum. We no longer have a proposal to repeal all the existing treaties and replace them by a constitution. Nor a proposal to change the name of the high representative to foreign minister. the trappings of statehood, ranging from the flag to the anthem have also been dropped.
Much as you might like to believe this, actually it wasn't the symbols of the EU that we thought were significant, but the substance. I often hear people in Brussels argue that that dropping the symbols (which of course exist already) is a big concession to public opinion. This is pretty patronising.
Indeed, in another place your colleague Jim Murphy actually claims that it is the dropping of the symbols which means it is no longer "constitutional", and that a referendum is no longer needed:
"[Jackie] Ashley is dismissive of the dropping of the anthem and symbols. But their omission from the new treaty represents the abandoning of the constitutional approach. These are not cosmetic changes. They represent a change of emphasis. EU leaders recognised that EU voters didn't want something with the trappings of a constitution.
This is an extraordinary argument, which I will let speak for itself. But to pick up your example, it isn't the name "foreign minister" that we think is significant-it's the new powers that go with it. As Romano Prodi has pointed out, "as long as we have more or less a European prime minister and a European foreign minister then we can give them any title."
Indeed, it isn't us that originally raised concerns about the new post. In fact the UK Government itself originally opposed many of the new powers that he or she will have. As the Guardian noted :
Britain said the new official should not chair regular meetings of EU foreign ministers, nor take over the resources of the European commissioner for external affairs. It lost.
On the vexed issue of the UN seat, the new text carries over the same language of the constitution, stating that "when the union has defined a position on a subject on the agenda of the UN Security Council, the member states who sit there shall ask that the high representative be invited to present the position of the union." (Old article III-305(2); now Article 19 TEU)
Initially the UK government (represented by Peter Hain) put down an amendment in the European Convention saying that this whole paragraph should be struck out. Peter Hain wrote: "the UK cannot accept any language which implies that it would not retain the right to speak in a national capacity on the UN Security Council." However, this was ignored, and so the UK then fell back to saying that it had to at least be changed, in order to remove the minister's seemingly automatic right to speak. In a second amendment the UK proposed a change to say that the minister could only request to speak on its behalf. But the UK's objections were ignored.
Your argument that this is not significant seems to be contradicted by the fact that the government thought it was. And they were right-such a proposal will limit our freedom of movement in New York. You may think that's a good thing, but it is certainly not insignificant.
More broadly, the Government also keeps insisting that unanimity "remains the rule" in foreign policy.
But from now on it would be a rule with some big exceptions-in fact there are moves to qualified majority voting in eleven different areas of foreign policy-for example on proposals from the EU foreign minister / high representative and on his or her election; on the design of the EU diplomatic service; on the inner core in defence (the "structured cooperation group"); on the terrorism and mutual defence clause; on urgent financial aid and humanitarian aid; on the new EU Foreign Policy Fund and on consular issues.
In 2003 Jack Straw said :
I made it clear that article III-201, which proposes QMV on proposals made by the union's minister for foreign affairs, is simply unacceptable.
But later the Government accepted it.
What does this mean in practice? Less influence.
For example, in a future squabble like that between NATO and the EU over who will supply air transport to the African Union troops in Darfur, the UK might not be able to block the EU from pointlessly duplicating NATO-if this was proposed as part of a plan from the foreign minister.
Or take another. Tony Blair cited the end of the veto on macro-financial aid and humanitarian aid as an uncontroversial example. To give a past real-world scenario, this might have been used to decide whether the union should continue to fund the Palestinian Authority after the 2006 elections which returned Hamas to power. Regardless of the rights or wrongs of the issue, the UK had the right to veto aid. In future we would not.
You say that Britain is not "handing over" powers on criminal law to the EU.
Again, it isn't us that said this was important.
The constitution would give the ECJ jurisdiction over criminal justice and policing for the first time, issues which it was excluded from in 1992. The current jurisdiction of the court over civil law, asylum and immigration is extremely limited. The current restrictions of standing are so stringent that only one asylum case has ever actually come before EU judges.
Under the constitutional treaty these restrictions are removed. The government has acknowledged in the past that this would be a big transfer of national sovereignty. A memorandum from the Foreign Office to the Lords EU committee said:
"The government does not accept that we should agree to extend full ECJ jurisdiction over the very sensitive areas covered by the Third Pillar. These raise sensitive issues relating to national sovereignty-law and order and the criminal justice process."
Only last October Geoff Hoon admitted: "there is clearly a risk that adding what is in effect an avenue of appeal at a very early stage in the process might be an opportunity of further complicating our existing asylum and immigration processes."
Again, you can say that this is a good thing. But it is not trivial, as the government has itself admitted.
There are other important changes vis-à-vis criminal justice.
The charter-now made legally binding for the first time, would also give criminal suspects new rights. For example, it would make it illegal under EU law to try someone twice for the same crime. This would mean that criminals like Billy Dunlop, who was successfully convicted of murdering Julie Hogg when new evidence came to light 15 years after he was originally acquitted, would go free.
The charter also states that "the severity of penalties must not be disproportionate to the criminal offence"-which seems to set limits on judicial discretion.
Article 69H of the new treaty (formerly article III-273 of the constitution) gives the European prosecutors network "Eurojust" new powers. The article says that the tasks of Eurojust "may include the initiation of criminal investigations". The UK asked for this to be deleted but later gave way.
Johannes Thuy, a spokesman for Eurojust, confirmed that under the new treaty, "we could compel the British police to make a prosecution." ( Sunday Times , 5 August 2007)
New articles 69J, K and L of the TFEU (formally Articles III-275, 276, and 277 of the constitution) strengthen the role and powers of Europol. Previous treaties have gradually expanded the role of Europol but its scope has remained limited to coordination. Article 69K would widen its role to include "organisation and implementation of investigative and operational action carried out jointly with the member states' competent authorities."
The European Scrutiny Committee has argued, "we see objections of principle to giving Europol its own investigative powers. This would fundamentally change Europol from an agency for the exchange and analysis of criminal intelligence into a European police force."
Caroline Flint also admitted that the Government does "not think that there is a role for" Europol to have investigative powers, but would prefer it to concentrate on information sharing. So these are important changes, even from the point of view of the Government.
Symbolic changes are simply not enough to justify breaking a promise to hold a referendum, however much you may have disagreed with it in the first place.
My question to you is-do you really believe that nothing in the new treaty is significant?
Best wishes,
Neil
A debate on Britain and the EU - day four
12th September
Dear Neil,
It's interesting to hear you say that you think that the term constitution and other abandoned features of the previous treaty were just symbolic. After all, many of your Eurosceptic pals relied precisely on the term "constitution" to argue that the then treaty was different from routine amending treaties and for that very reason required a referendum.
Now that you face a mere amending treaty, and you are forced onto the ground of considering the substance of the text, it is striking that the things you have found to raise in your letter amount to little more than nit-picking over detailed wording, trying to build them up as matters of great significance.
You cite in aid differences of wording in the various drafts submitted during the negotiations. Britain, and no doubt most governments, put forward suggestions that differed from the final version. Wow! Fancy that-all 27 governments didn't put forward the same wording at the same time and actually had to haggle to reach agreement! Come off it-the only real question is whether the outcome is acceptable.
One thing you find unacceptable is allowing the EU representative to speak at the UN. When EU countries have a common position, what is wrong with asking the high representative to present the union's position? This can only happen when they do have a common position-so Britain will have agreed it in the first place. It is something that happens now, so it is not a new departure. And it certainly addresses the concern you quote expressed by Peter Hain that "the UK cannot accept any language which implies that it will not retain the right to speak in a national capacity in the Security Council", as that right is retained in full.
You also question whether unanimity remains the rule in foreign policy. It does, not least for defining policy. The exceptions that you cite as "moves to qualified majority voting" are for implementing measures in pursuit of that policy, and even then the treaty says (in a paragraph you conveniently forget to cite) that "if a member of the Council declares that, for vital and stated reasons of national policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a European decision to be adopted by a qualified majority vote, a vote shall not be taken ".
Unfortunately, I have all too often come across Eurosceptics using selective quotation-and leaving out the main safeguard-as a method of argument. You do so on other points too in your letter.
On Europol, neither you, worrying about its role in "implementation of investigative and operational action", nor the recent tabloid story talking of French police roaming our streets, took the trouble to cite paragraph 3 of the same treaty article which states that "any operational action by Europol must be carried out in liaison and in agreement with the authorities of the Member State(s) whose territory is concerned".
Similarly, you worry that the tasks of Eurojust may include the initiation of "criminal investigations". You forget to mention that this is in the context of a mission which is defined in the very first paragraph of the article you cite, namely "to support and strengthen coordination and cooperation between national investigating and prosecuting authorities in relation to serious crime affecting two or more Member States ....". This gives a slightly different slant doesn't it?
You apply the same tactic in your comments about the extension of European Court of Justice (ECJ) jurisdiction over criminal justice. It is surely pertinent to mention that this is an area where Britain has the right to choose whether to opt-in or out of any measure-so there will be no ECJ jurisdiction where we don't want it.
That being said, I am always surprised at the vehemence of eurosceptic attacks on the ECJ. The court cannot make laws, it can only adjudicate on different interpretations of the texts that have been adopted by Member States. As one former British president of the court once said, "the judges do not take political decisions, but they do, sometimes, have to remind politicians of what they agreed". Unlike the US Supreme Court, whose members are appointed by federal institutions (the President and the Senate) the ECJ is appointed by member states, not by the Commission or the European Parliament.
Yes, the court can make rulings against member states who do not implement what they have signed up to. That is precisely why Britain won its case against France, when the latter refused to accept British beef even after it had been declared to be safe again. Thanks to the European legal system, Britain was able to enforce its rights-something we would not be able to do if we outside the Union (and, by the way, most Commonwealth countries and the USA still refuse to accept our beef, whereas all 27 EU countries do).
You ask me whether I really believe that nothing in the treaty is significant? Well, it does contain a lot of small, useful, pragmatic changes that, together, amount to a significant improvement to the EU's efficiency and democratic accountability. If you mean do I think it changes the nature of the EU, no I don't. Does it transfer new fields of competence to collective EU action? No, it doesn't. Is there anything remotely significant enough in the reform treaty to justify holding a nationwide referendum on an international treaty for the first time in our history? No, there isn't.
It is precisely because of this that I find the single-minded vehemence of the opposition to this treaty to be revealing. Open Europe is not an open minded, dispassionate think-tank evaluating in a balanced way the pros and cons of the proposed treaty-it is a committed campaigning organisation dedicated to finding fault, real or imaginary, with the EU in general and the Reform Treaty in particular, even by means of misleadingly selective quotation, which are then parroted by your allies in UKIP, the Conservative party and sections of the media.
In the media, we have seen in recent days totally false claims that the EU would remove Queen from our passports, release moors murderer Ian Brady, split England up into regions, and much more besides-adding to a long history of such scare stories, designed to load the dice in any public debate on Europe.
Such dedicated and focused (and well financed and organised) campaigning against the European Union can only have one objective: Britain's exit from the EU.
Yet there are three good reasons for us to play an important part in Europe. They are idealistic, pragmatic and selfish. The idealistic reason is to do with the fact that the EU has helped create, in a continent previously torn apart by warfare, an area of peace and stability, where we can have our arguments around a negotiating table or across a debating chamber rather than on the battlefields of Europe. The pragmatic reason is that we are a set of highly interdependent neighbouring countries with a need to find common solutions to common problems in a whole range of areas. The selfish reason is that it is vital for the British economy and British jobs, with the overwhelming majority of our exports going to countries in the common market, that we have a voice in the institutions that set the rules for that market.
For all these reasons, we should work to improve the EU, not to destroy it. The new treaty will help as far as the institutions are concerned, allowing us to move on to focus on what really matters for people: the delivery of policy on issues like climate change, a deeper internal market, reform of the CAP, consumer protection, fighting transnational criminal gangs, and so on. Rejection of the Treaty would leave us wrangling about institutional questions for years to come. That might keep you and me in the business of arguing with each other, but it won't do anyone any good.
Best wishes,
Richard
A debate on Britain and the EU - day five
14th September
Dear Richard,
I see that we have now reached the predictable point in the argument where you resort to the claim that I am secretly a hysterical "anti-European" fanatic and want to tear it all down. Actually my position is and always has been-as you put it-"to work to improve the EU, not to destroy it."
I'm kind of disappointed, as I had thought better of you. However, I'm not totally surprised. One of the problems with the euro debate in Britain is that anyone who calls for reform beyond the fairly narrow confines of the current Brussels consensus is immediately attacked as an "anti-European". I think it reveals a lack of confidence in your argument.
In the Laeken declaration EU leaders correctly noted that the EU had a number of serious problems which needed to be addressed: the democratic deficit, chronic over-interference and the lack of any flow of powers back from Brussels to member states.
Given this diagnosis there are two main problems with the plan to reheat the rejected constitution.
First it is not really a "reform treaty"-despite the label-because its contents do not address the fundamental problems which were identified at Laeken. Just like the original version, it would transfer further powers to the EU, and would mean more, not less legislation.
Second, given the overwhelming no votes, pushing through the rejected constitution behind voters' backs would now actually compound the problem further.
The no votes should have prompted a genuine re-think. It would even have been OK if, the EU had simply decided to drop the constitution and decided to "move on to focus on what really matters for people".
But no. Our leaders have obsessively returned to the issue of more powers for the EU. Indeed, if the reheated constitutional treaty is passed, I see no sign that this drive towards ever greater centralisation will cease.
Nicolas Sarkozy said the other day that he will not allow negotiations with Turkey to go any further unless other member states agree to his idea of a new " wise men's group " (on the model of the Delors Committee) which he wants to report in a year and a half's time.
In other words he is already starting to talk about even further transfers of power, after the constitutional treaty. Angela Merkel and José Manuel Barroso are backing the plan while Britain, as usual, simply hopes it will all go away.
More incrementalism
The new constitutional treaty would reinforce two of the problems diagnosed in Laeken.
First, the method of incrementalism, which is a central reason for the public's mistrust of the EU. The feeling that there is a chronic salami-slicer at work is what people really don't like.
But the treaty makes this problem worse. Article 33 would allow further vetoes to be given up, or changes to be made to the text of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union without the need for any new treaty.
The treaty based revision process has meant that changes in the Single European Act and the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice treaties have been 'package deals', introducing many changes at once, which attracted public interest and sparked debate. The mechanisms set out in the revised constitution, which would allow it to be gradually altered, would clearly reduce the level of scrutiny of future changes. Its adoption would probably be the last practical opportunity to call for a referendum.
Again, it is not just us that believe that this is significant. In fact the British government originally opposed it.
In 2003 Denis MacShane (then Europe minister) told the Standing Committee on the IGC: "we think that a self-amending constitutional treaty does not make a lot of sense" and claimed "there is no enthusiasm for the clause in the European Union."
Later Jack Straw (then foreign secretary) promised that the government would only sign up to it "provided that there was a lock that required every national Parliament to endorse that decision." But this promise has been broken. In the case of giving up the veto, the new treaty does not even require the consent of Parliament.
Reform versus more of the same
The other problem diagnosed at Laeken is also reinforced.
Instead of less interference, there would be even more legislation: first because it changes the voting system (which even the Foreign Office have admitted will make it harder to block legislation we oppose) and second because it abolishes the veto in 60 new areas.
What does that mean in practice?
Look at giving up the veto on energy. The European Commission previously proposed a huge increase in oil reserves, which would have cost Britain up to three billion pounds to implement. Previously Britain was able to veto this proposal, but under the constitutional treaty it could go ahead.
It's not like the EU is grinding to a halt. Over the last ten years, 14,602 pieces of legislation have hit the EU statute book. The British Chambers of Commerce estimate, based on the Government's own impact assessments, that EU regulation has cost the British economy £40 billion since 1998.
Meanwhile there is no real reform. The new treaty does nothing to sort out the EU's chronic problems with fraud. According to its own figures, the EU loses one million pounds every working day to fraud. Its budget has not been signed off by its own auditors for twelve years in a row. It spends £200 million a year just ferrying MEPs back and forth between its two parliament buildings in Strasbourg and Brussels every month. Can't we even sort out the most glaring and ludicrous problems?
Scepticism in the true sense
There is a dreadful cycle in EU politics where something is proposed in Brussels and critics of deeper integration raise the alarm. Proponents of deeper integration first say that it is a myth and will never happen. They then move on to say it will happen but that we have safeguards / declarations / assurances about it. Then something bad happens as a result of it and proponents of deeper integration say it is now too late to do anything about it.
Take the 2004 free movement directive. The government believe that Learco Chindamo, a convicted murderer, should be deported back to Italy. However, this cannot happen because of the directive (as Jack Straw, the justice minister, has acknowledged).
Regardless of the merits of the case, this is an example of why we should look before we leap. If we are going to sign up to the revived constitution, we need a proper national debate before we do so, and the only way to do that is to have a referendum.
Still nothing I have heard from you in this discussion so far explains why the referendum was justified before, but is not now.
As your own committee in the European Parliament has noted: "the mandate safeguards much of the substance of the constitutional treaty"
They were right. Readers can have a look at our side-by-side comparison if they want to see for themselves how alike the old and new versions are.
So what is the change that makes this thing no longer constitutional, and no longer worthy of a referendum? Please don't tell me it is dropping the name or the flag. Your assertion that it is because that the treaties are no longer consolidated into one text is an example of what psychologists call mirror-imaging.
Referendum opponents insisted that this was the main point because you wanted to present it as a "tidying up exercise". But for us it was always the substance.
The kernel of the argument for referendums is that if the politicians we elect want to transfer away powers which we the public have only lent to them in the first place, then they must consult the people first.
The case is particularly strong if the change that is being proposed cannot be reversed. So why on earth do you back referendums on local mayors but not on something like this? It is truly absurd.
This isn't even just about Europe. This is about trust in politics. As Gordon Brown said recently: "the manifesto is what we put to the public. We've got to honour that manifesto. That is an issue of trust for me with the electorate."
Well, I seem to remember that the manifesto said that: "the new constitutional treaty ensures the new Europe can work effectively... We will put it to the British people in a referendum."
Some supporters of deeper integration are listening. A former German president, Roman Herzog, wrote earlier this year that:
"Most people have a fundamentally positive attitude to European integration. But at the same time, they have an ever increasing feeling that something is going wrong, that an non-transparent, complex, intricate, mammoth institution has evolved, divorced from the factual problems and national traditions, grabbing ever greater competences and areas of power; that the democratic control mechanisms are failing: in brief, that it cannot go on like this."
He was right. The EU has taken a wrong turning and needs to go back to the future set out in Laeken.
Will other politicians learn to listen? We are supporting I want a referendum.com to make sure that they do. If you really care about democracy-and about trust in politics-then I hope that you'll join us.
Best wishes,
Neil
A debate on Britain and the EU - last post
14th September
Dear Neil,
Fundamental to trust in politics is honesty in debate. I see that you do not even attempt to respond to my criticism and examples about how you quote selectively from the treaty in order to misrepresent it. Nor do you distance yourself from the outright lies that I mentioned about removing the Queen's head from our passports, forcing the release of moors murderer Ian Brady, Britain losing its seat on the UN Security Council and so on.
But, then, maybe you didn't read my letter, as you say that you have heard nothing from me in this discussion to explain why a referendum was justified before but is not now. I can only invite you to re-read those paragraphs. A referendum on having a constitution was one thing. Having one on a set of modest changes to the already existing treaties is quite another. You say that the only way to have a "proper national debate .. is to have a referendum". That is an extraordinary claim! If true, it would mean that Britain has never had a national debate on health, education, NATO membership, the monarchy, pensions, unemployment and so on. Fortunately, we have a Parliament to consider multi-faceted issues in detail. I am wary of your claim not to be 'anti-European'. I have yet to read a single positive comment about the European Union from Open Europe. I have only seen criticisms. The numerous Open Europe papers are almost unremittingly negative-and almost always biased, exaggerated or even based on invention.
Your Open Europe website is full of allegations on the horrifying consequences of EU legislation and never on its benefits. Of course, European legislation, like national legislation, can get things wrong-and when that happens change, not exit, is necessary. But when we get it right, European legislation is an exercise in cutting bureaucracy and red-tape. A business can now register a trade-mark once and it is valid in 27 countries, rather than having to go through 27 different procedures, deal with 27 different bureaucracies and pay 27 different fees-and this thanks to European legislation. Agreeing common rules and standards makes it easier for companies to do business. A lorry taking British exports to Italy now needs only a single administrative document to cross frontiers, instead of the 20-odd or more that used to be necessary. Nowhere do you mention this.
On my side, as a pro-European, I do not hesitate to criticise the European Union when I think that it is wrong or at fault. I share entirely your criticism of the wasted expenditure incurred by the obligation that member states impose on the European Parliament to shift its operations for one week a month to Strasbourg. This, by the way, is difficult to change because of the need for unanimity among national governments-something you defend!
In your last letter, you repeat a whole set of tired eurosceptic clichés, both about Europe and the new treaty, but without giving examples to justify them. You say that in general, the EU is about "transferring away" powers and losing our capacity to act. No, the EU is about exercising some powers jointly or in coordination with our neighbours, when it is more effective to act together. Acting in a purely national context on matters such as the environment is less effective than joint action across our continent. If you have a common market then you need some common rules if is to work fairly and well. This is not the "surrender" of sovereignty-it is the joint exercise of sovereignty to magnify our real capacity for action.
Most people in Britain recognise this. That is why in every general election since 1974, the more eurosceptic of our two main parties (Labour in the 1970s and 80s and Conservative 90s and 00s) has lost.
You say that the reform treaty itself is about "more powers for the EU" and you refer to a "drive towards ever greater centralisation". Yet this is a treaty that does not create a single new chapter of EU competence, but changes the way it exercises its existing competences, not least to improve democratic accountability (such as by strengthening the role of both national parliaments and the European Parliament) and adding extra checks and balances.
Particularly misleading is to encourage the prejudice that the EU involves transferring powers to "unelected and unaccountable bureaucrats". If this were the case, I myself would be against the European Union! But as you presumably know, EU policies and legislation are in fact decided by elected politicians in the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. Under the EU's "co-decision" procedure, the European Commission only has the right to propose legislation, not to adopt it. The commission is anyway accountable to the European Parliament which must approve its appointment and can dismiss it.
Perhaps because of the lack of an actual transfer of responsibilities to the EU in this treaty, you make the claim that the treaty is "self-amending" and responsibilities could be changed incrementally thereafter without our consent. Even under the simplified revision procedure, which is only allowable for changes that do "not increase the competences conferred on the union in the treaties" (another clause you conveniently fail to mention), no change to the EU treaties can be made without the approval of each and every member state. Whether or not we want to make further changes to the EU treaty therefore lies entirely in our hands.
You say such changes do "not even require the consent of Parliament", without citing the requirement that any such proposal "shall be notified to the national Parliaments" and that if even a single one objects, the decision "shall not be adopted" -another example of you wilfully misleading your readers by omitting to quote in full.
The one EU document that you do cite favourably is the Laeken declaration-though in order to claim that it has not been addressed. Yet the reform treaty is the end-product of the Laeken declaration in that it responds precisely to the issues that member states identified in Laeken. As you said, Laeken asked for examination of the scope of EU powers and of the 'democratic deficit'.
On the scope of EU powers, the reform treaty will contain language specifying that powers can be returned to the member states. Whether this is necessary or not depends on the member states themselves, because they are the gatekeepers of what goes into the European domain and what does not. And it is worth recalling that the EU cannot deal with any subject unless all member states have agreed to put it into the treaty. Even then, the intensity of EU action is determined by the Council, a body composed of national ministers from national governments accountable to national parliaments. The EU does not determine its own remit-member states do. That explains why, in the main, member states are happy with its current remit that they themselves have determined.
The democratic deficit is addressed by providing that any EU legislative proposal must first be examined by national parliaments and then requires the double approval of elected governments in the Council of Ministers and directly elected MEPs in the European Parliament. As I said before, this is a degree of parliamentary scrutiny that exists in no other international structure.
I was interested to see your assertion that this discussion boils down to "reform versus more of the same" . This is indeed the case. Blocking the reform treaty will mean more of the same-the EU as it is now, with less democratic scrutiny, accountability or transparency than it should have, and constrained by a structure that was designed for a union of 15 rather than 27 nations. The reform treaty is a set of useful reforms. You should welcome it, and its provisions, rather than whipping up eurosceptic hysteria with selective quotation and wild-eyed claims that bear no resemblance to the reality of the text.
Best wishes,
Richard